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This study offers a detailed analysis of community-based management (CBM) in a small
island in Indonesia. In the study site, area-specific stewardship for a marine territory
was informally institutionalized and, in addition to state rules, locally devised rules based
on informal agreements have emerged. Using multiple methods for the analysis of the
perceptions of the local community, this research examines the actual impact of the
different rules on the fishing patterns in that sea territory, and illuminates the rationales of
the local population to engage (or not) in the community-based approach to manage the
marine resources. The study shows that the CBM initiative has to be seen as part of a
convoluted regulatory system that impacts the fishing behavior in the sea territory. A lack
of official authority to formally develop and especially to locally enforce rules represents a
key challenges for the CBM initiative. This is further complicated by severe coordination
problems between the local community and higher level state actors. The study further
shows that the motivation of the community members to engage in the enforcement of
the informal rules is strongly based on short-term economic considerations. For rules that
are perceived to have a strong impact on the individual fishing yields, the fear of potential
short-term economic losses constitutes a particular success factor of the local initiative
since it motivates the members of the community to enforce local rules, especially when
outside fishers break the rules. Yet, if rule-breaking is not perceived to decrease individual
fishing yield, or if benefits of the generated yields are shared with the community as a
compensation mechanism, the motivation of the community members to engage in rule
enforcement ceases.
Keywords: blast fishing, common-pool-resource regimes, fisheries management, Net-Map, perceptions, poison
fishing, Spermonde Archipelago, territoriality
INTRODUCTION
Concerns about the world’s oceans and coasts are rapidly growing (Rockström et al., 2009; Burke
et al., 2011; Visbeck et al., 2013; Zondervan et al., 2013). One of the most severe threats for
marine ecosystems and their associated natural resources emanates from the unregulated and
uncontrolled resource use, i.e., an open access situation (The World Bank, 2006). Open access to
marine resources is common all over the world since rules, regulations and management are often
either lacking or not effectively enforced (Agardy et al., 2005). Such an open access situation is
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widely assumed to lead to substantial sustainability deficits
(Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990; Agardy et al., 2005; The World
Bank, 2006). The purpose of this article is to advance
understanding of how to institute more effective community-
based marine resource management in a small island setting.
Transforming an open access situation into any type of
management regime requires the delineation of territory. While
it appears to be more difficult to establish territoriality for marine
areas than for terrestrial areas (The World Bank, 2006), research
shows that it can be developed, legitimized and institutionalized
(Kalikoski, 2007; Glaser et al., 2010). Marine territoriality
implies area-specific stewardship coupled with legitimate rights
to generate effective means based on formal and/or informal
authority that steer human behavior in a specified sea area (Jones,
2014). In this regard, the concept of Common Pool Resource
Regimes (CPRR) offers a useful point of departure (Ostrom,
1990; Young, 2006). The related literature holds that, apart
from an open access situation, there are three proto-types of
CPRR. These include the state CPRR, the private CPRR and the
communal CPRR (Bromley and Cernea, 1989; Ostrom, 1990;
Pomeroy and Berkes, 1997; Pomeroy and Rivera-Guib, 2006).
In a “state CPRR,” the state assumes control over the resources
or specified territories. Individuals and groups can only use
the resources with the consent of the state and must comply
with the regulations made by government laws. The state can
grant the right to exploit resources to individuals or groups,
but control over the resources is exercised by the state (i.e., by
government agencies; Bromley and Cernea, 1989). A “private
CPRR” refers to the exclusive possession of an area or a set
of resources by private entities. Such private entities may not
necessarily be individuals, but private ownership can also be
transferred to clearly defined groups (corporate private property;
Bromley and Cernea, 1989). In a private CPRR, the control over
a specified territory, its resources and its products is given to
private entities (owner). They hereby gain the right to exercise
their rewarded power to exclude others from the use of their
terrain or prevent usage of their resources from non-owners.
The third category is the “communal CPRR” which has attracted
particular attention over the past decades (cf. Dearden et al.,
2005; Berkes, 2007b). Such a community-based management
(CBM) approach describes a management system of a clearly
defined group of people for a set of natural resources or a
particular area (Berkes, 2010). Since CBM encompasses many
different management situations in which natural resources,
whole ecosystems or territories are “owned” and managed by
local groups, there is no general definition available. Yet, the
quintessence of CBM is that management authority for a defined
territory or set of resources is transferred to, or rests with,
a clearly defined group at a local level, which shares certain
common characteristics (e.g., ethnicity) or commonly resides in
a geographical area (Armitage, 2005).
Especially in tropical nations with weak state institutions,
CBM has become a popular alternative approach for marine
resource management. This is based on the notion that local
actors are better suited to devise rules for addressing the roots
of marine resource degradation (such as overfishing or the
use of destructive fishing gears) than command-and-control
approaches and other centrally organized solely government
driven approaches (Ruddle, 1999; Ferse et al., 2010, 2014; Cinner
et al., 2012). In fact, local communities all over the world have
been involved in self-organized approaches to managing natural
resources for centuries, and the idea of CBM originated from
the acknowledgement of the effectiveness of such indigenous and
traditional management systems for natural resources (Wade,
1988; Ostrom, 1990; Hidayat, 2005; Berkes, 2007a). A variety of
management regimes for the sustainable use of natural resources
has thus emerged based on local decision-making structures and
formal or informal rules to secure the long-term socio-economic
well-being of local populations (Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2004,
and references therein). The strength of such collaborative
local endeavors is that communities can create solutions to
local natural resource use problems, which are tailored to the
particular local socio-cultural and environmental circumstances
(Alcala, 1998; Armitage, 2005; Pomeroy and Rivera-Guib, 2006).
Yet, it is also widely acknowledged today that CBM is
not a one-size-fits-all solution to successful marine resource
management (Berkes, 2004; Cudney-Bueno and Basurto, 2009;
Cinner et al., 2012). Rather, CBM approaches for natural
resources harbor a series of hazards and cannot be assumed
to be a “panacea” or “blueprint” for successful natural resource
management. Various studies have shown that their risk of failure
is high (cf. Berkes, 2007b; Christie and White, 2007; Cudney-
Bueno and Basurto, 2009; Cinner et al., 2012; Adhuri, 2013).
Moreover, it cannot be simply assumed that if government actors
endorse the development of CBM initiatives, new and effective
rules will automatically emerge for successful CBM of natural
resources (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992, 1999). Berkes (2004, p.
623) highlights in this regard that a “community” is a complex,
elusive and multidimensional construct under constant change.
Even small communities, therefore, cannot be seen as a unitary
actor who per se acts toward the long-term benefit of the entire
community. Rather, every community, whether small or large,
is characterized by internal divergences of interests because any
community is made up of various individuals and groups, which
are embedded in larger systems and affected by influences from
the outside (Berkes, 2004). Further empirical research is thus
needed to better understand under which circumstances local
initiatives can lead to improved sustainable marine resource
use in a certain sea territory, and when CBM faces strong
difficulties.
Many studies have focused on the design of successful and
persistent institutions in a self-organized CBM context that
effect more sustainable resource use among the members of
a community (cf. Wade, 1988; Ostrom, 1990; Cinner et al.,
2012). Much less empirical research is available with regards to
implementing CBM in the context of a regional resource use
system, and in relation to CBM as part of a nested rule system
to regulate resource use in a particular sea territory. In order
to contribute to fill this gap, this study empirically investigates
a CBM regime for the sea area surrounding Langkai Island, a
small island located in the Indonesian Spermonde Archipelago
off the coast of Makassar City. The objective of this research
is two-fold: First, the study aims to provide a detailed analysis
of what rules produced by which CPRR type actually have an
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impact on the fishing patterns in the sea territory as perceived
by local resource users, and to illuminate potential challenges
associated with implementing the rules generated by the different
CPRR. The second objective of this article is to examine what
motivates the local resource users to engage (or not) in the
CBM of the marine resources. This article hereby complements
previous more general work on CBM and informal rules in the
Spermonde Archipelago by Deswandi (2012), Glaser et al. (2010,
2015) and Idrus (2009).
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The
subsequent section provides an introduction of the study
site, which outlines the particular fisheries related problems
encountered and illuminates the presently implemented means
to address them. Next, the methods applied in this research
are described. The article then turns to the results. There, the
article first focuses on understanding what rules actually affect the
fishing patterns in the sea territory surrounding the study island
based on the exploration of the perceptions of local fishers. The
following section of the results then examines the rationales of
the local fishers for engaging (or not) in the CBM initiative. The
results are then discussed and put in a wider context. The article
concludes with highlighting the main findings of the study and
indicating further research needs to improve CBM initiatives for
marine resource management.
STUDY AREA: THE SPERMONDE
ARCHIPELAGO, INDONESIA
Indonesia is located within the Coral Triangle, one of the world’s
marine biodiversity hotspots (Burke et al., 2011). The country
has about 81,000 km of coastline comprising about 4000 ha
of mangrove forests and the national territory encompasses 5.8
million km2 of sea area, of which∼51,000 km2 contain coral reefs
(Syarif, 2009). The marine waters and its natural resources are of
fundamental strategic, economic and environmental importance
for Indonesia (Cribb and Ford, 2009). Yet, as a result of myriad
anthropogenic pressures (Syarif, 2009), Indonesia is expected
to experience the strongest decline in fisheries of any nation
worldwide (Cheung et al., 2010). This is most severe for the
people living in rural coastal areas and small islands, putting
the livelihood security of millions of people at jeopardy (Ferrol-
Schulte et al., 2013, 2015).
In order to effect more sustainable resource use in Indonesia,
a number of laws have been developed in an attempt to regulate
the use of the country’s fishery resources (cf. Syarif, 2009).
These include for instance the ban of destructive fishing gears
such as poison and blast fishing, and legislation to support the
development of marine protected areas (Ferrol-Schulte et al.,
2015). Yet, the different laws pertaining to the regulation of
fisheries appear to only have little traction on the ground
(Satria and Matsuda, 2004; Radjawali, 2012; Wever et al.,
2012). Despite the existence of numerous Indonesian laws in
the environmental realm, there have been only very few cases
of effective enforcement through courts nationwide (Waddell,
2009). Especially in areas far away from larger towns and cities,
the enforcement of government rules including the prohibition
of blast and poison fishing by enforcement agencies is highly
difficult.
This study focuses on Langkai Island, a small island located at
the outer margins of the Spermonde Archipelago, South Sulawesi
(see Figure 1). The archipelago consists of∼80–100 small islands
inhabited by about 35,000 people (Sab and Katsuya, 2008). The
islands greatly differ in terms of socio-economic characteristics
(Glaeser and Glaser, 2010). The Spermonde Archipelago is
home to one of the largest reef fisheries in Indonesia (Pet-
soede and Erdmann, 1998). Due to the physical characteristics
of the islands, which hardly permit any land-based livelihood
activities (Schwerdtner Máñez et al., 2012), fishery resources are
of fundamental importance to provide the households in the
archipelago with monetary and subsistence income (Pet-Soede
et al., 2001; Glaser et al., 2015; Miñarro et al., 2016).
Yet, similar to other areas in Indonesia and elsewhere in
South-East Asia (Burke et al., 2011), the fisheries resources in
the Spermonde Archipelago are increasingly depleted (Glaeser
and Glaser, 2010; Glaser et al., 2010; Ferse et al., 2012) and
the coral reef ecosystems are heavily degraded (Edinger et al.,
1998; Plass-Johnson et al., 2015a,b, 2016). This jeopardizes the
livelihoods of thousands of people as an ever growing number
of fishers in the archipelago competes for increasingly scarce
marine resources (Glaser et al., 2010; Deswandi, 2012; Miñarro
et al., 2016). Moreover, unsustainable and destructive fishing
practices including blast and poison fishing are used all over the
archipelago and pose a major threat to the viability of marine
resources andmarine ecosystems (for more details on destructive
fishing and its consequences on the marine ecosystems in
the Spermonde Archipelago see esp. Pet-Soede et al., 1999;
Chozin, 2008; Wilkinson, 2008; Idrus, 2009; Ferse et al., 2014;
Pauwelussen, 2015).
Effective means for more sustainable marine resource
use are thus urgently needed to address this development.
Unlike elsewhere in Indonesia, traditional customary fishery
management systems such as the sasi laut in the Maluku
Archipelago, for instance described in detail by Novaczek et al.
(2001), are not found in the Spermonde Archipelago. Yet,
in addition to official government laws, informal means to
organize marine resource use have emerged in the Spermonde
Archipelago. Today, local agreements between fishers (locally
called kesepakatan) constitute informal rules, which have
developed over time, and contribute to organizing the fishery in
several areas in the Spermonde Archipelago (Glaser et al., 2010,
2015), including the sea territory around Langkai Island.
METHODS
The research applies a mixed-methods anthropological research
approach to advance understanding of how to institute more
effective community-based marine resource management in a
small island setting. The study was conducted as part of the
third phase of the joint German-Indonesian research program
SPICE (Science for the Protection of Indonesian Coastal Marine
Systems, 2012–2015) and builds upon the research conducted
during the second phase of the SPICE program (2007–2010).
Data for this study were collected over a 6 month field research
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FIGURE 1 | Langkai Island, South Sulawesi, Indonesia.
period in the Spermonde Archipelago area from September
2012 to March 2013. Three visits of about 2 weeks each to
Langkai Island were carried out. Further islands, including
Lanyukang Island, Barrang Lompo Island, Lumu-Lumu Island,
and Barrang Cadi Island, which are located in close vicinity
of the study island (up to 2 h by boat), were visited for
shorter time periods of about 2–5 days. In addition, a number
of interviews with government officials on Sulawesi were
conducted for the purpose of this study. Prior informed consent
was obtained from all informants in this study. Moreover,
the research was conducted in accordance with all ethical
standards outlined in the Amended and Updated White Paper
on Safeguarding Good Scientific Practice by the German Science
Foundation [Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), 2013].
The following section outlines the different methods used in
this research (for more details on the methods see Bernard,
2006).
Key Informant Interviews
Using a semi-structured interview outline with open-ended
questions, in-depth interviews were conducted with 69
informants on Langkai Island, on other small adjacent islands
whose inhabitants frequently fish in the Langkai Island area,
and government officials in Makassar City. The vast majority
of respondents in all islands were fishers, but interviews were
also conducted with traders and island officials with functions
in the local administration structure1 (for details see Table 1).
In addition, interviews were carried out with government
officials in Makassar City from the Water Police, BAPPEDA
(Badan Perencana Pembangunan Daerah, responsible for marine
spatial planning) and DKP (Dinas Kelautan dan Perikanaan,
responsible for fisheries and marine conservation). Usually, an
informant was not only interviewed once but visited several
1Note that almost all of the positions in the administrative structure at the local
level are voluntary and unsalaried, and the vast majority of the island officials relied
more or less directly on fishery related livelihood activities such as fishing, trading,
fishing boat construction etc. for their income.
TABLE 1 | Key informants.
Area Fisher Trader Government Total number
official of informants*
Langkai Island 32 2 4 34
Barrang Lompo Island 10 – – 10
Lumu-Lumu Island 5 2 2 7
Lanyukang Island 3 1 1 4
Barrang Cadi Island 1 – 1 2
Makassar City – – 12 12
Total 69
*Some of the informants fall in multiple categories.
times over the 6 months research period to inquire about
different topics related to this study. Especially on Langkai
Island, about eight informants served as central informants and
conversations were held almost every day during the time spent
on the island. In general, all interviews focused on understanding
the development of the Langkai Island economy, changes of
the social, economic and ecological circumstances, the different
mechanisms in place that aim at organizing the appropriation
of fishery resources in the sea territory surrounding Langkai
Island, the impacts of these mechanisms on fishing behavior,
and the reasons why some mechanisms work better than others.
The particular topics covered in each interview were aligned
to the expected knowledge of the informant, and sometimes
adjusted to the actual knowledge of the interviewee. Except
for the interviews with government officials, with whom more
formal interviews were conducted, the interviews in the islands
were not conducted as formal interviews since the topics
covered highly sensitive matters such as the involvement in
illegal fishing activities. Rather, after announcing the topic of
this research, the intended use of the information, assuring
anonymity to the individual respondents and obtaining informed
consent from the informants, the interviews were carried out
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as informal conversations on the topic of the research to build
as much trust as possible. Small groups of fishers, or individual
fishers, were randomly approached at their homes or in public
places in different areas of the small islands. Sometimes, upon
recommendation by other island inhabitants, certain individuals
were visited and asked to participate in the interviews because of
their key role in CBM, or their anticipated in-depth knowledge
of a particular aspect of the research. None of the conversations
was recorded to further ensure an informal atmosphere and
anonymity of the informant. Instead, particular effort was given
to accurately document the content of the conversation in field
notes during and after the conversations. All interviews were
conducted by the author of this article with the help of a research
assistant, who is a native speaker of the different local languages
used in the area and has extended experience in working with
the island communities on marine resource management in the
Spermonde Archipelago and nearby areas. Where applicable,
information received in one interview were triangulated in
various interviews in the study island, on other islands, and on
the Sulawesi “mainland” to verify data and cover a wider range of
perspectives.
Participatory Observation
Participatory observation is a research method mainly used
in cultural anthropology (Bernard, 2006). For this study, it
was used to learn about social processes the interviewees
may not be aware of, or are reluctant to talk about, and to
further triangulate information obtained otherwise. The scope of
participant observation in this study was limited, however, and
only included attending relevant official meetings and informal
gatherings, as well as observations of fishing behavior in the
waters surrounding the island.
Net-Map Interviews
An adapted version of the participatory research method “Net-
Map,” described in detail by Schiffer and Hauck (2010), was used
for this study. The method allows to visualize knowledge about
the interplay of complex formal and informal social relations, the
influence different actors exert on resource use patterns, and to
unveil the social processes in natural resource management (cf.
Gorris, 2015; Hauck et al., 2015). Two Net-Maps were developed
in group interview sessions with fishers. The social relations that
influence the fishing pattern in the Langkai Island waters, as
perceived by the participants, were mapped. One group session
was conducted with fishers from Langkai Island and the other
group interview session was carried out with fishers from another
nearby community in Barrang Lompo Island, who were well-
known for using illegal fishing methods. On Langkai Island, the
Net-Map group was composed of eight participants. On Barrang
Lompo Island, the Net-Map session consisted of six participants.
It was not intended to ensure a representative sample of the
respective island in these interviews, but rather to ensure that the
interview participants had long-standing experience of fishing
in the sea area around Langkai Island, and possessed in-depth
knowledge on how the fishery in the area is organized. Hence,
all interview participants in both Net-Map sessions were fishers
who frequently fished in the sea territory surrounding Langkai
Island and were thus equipped with in-depth knowledge of the
organization of the fishery in the area. Moreover, it was sought
to include representatives of the wide variety of different fishing
gears used in the Langkai Island sea area. Potential candidates
meeting these requirements were identified prior to the Net-
Map session based on recommendations by key informants, or
were key informants themselves as described above. Potential
candidates were contacted at their residences, or their fishing
boats after fishing trips. Yet, eventual participation in the Net-
Map group interview depended on the availability and interest of
the fisher.
The Net-Maps were developed in a three-step process. A large
sheet of paper was placed in front of the netmapping group. In
a first step, the participants were invited to think of all actors
that either are affected by, or themselves affect the management
of natural resources in the waters surrounding the study island,
i.e., who fishes in that area using what gear type, or who has an
influence on the marine resource use patterns in the area. The
identified actors were noted on cards and glued on the paper.
In a second step, the netmapping group described who exercises
influence affecting another actor. Influence of one actor toward
another actor was indicated by an arrow on the paper. In a third
step, the netmapping group participants were asked to judge how
much influence they considered the different actors to have on
the way marine resources are used in the area. A scale between
one and four (four representing the highest possible influence)
was used to determine the degree of influence of the respective
actor. Discussions on the reasons for the thus constructed map
followed. The netmapping approach, as adapted and used in this
study, offers the opportunity to advance understanding of the de
facto marine resource management through the visualization of
social relations that affect marine resource use in the Langkai
Island sea area. Data was digitalized and visualized using the
social network analysis software Gephi.
Survey
The study was complemented by the results of a survey (for
details see Supplementary Material in the online version of
this article) with fishing households to provide socio-economic
context data for Langkai Island (see Section Langkai Island:
Fueling the Local Economy). The survey was conducted by a
team of German and Indonesian researchers in several islands
in the Spermonde Archipelago. This article only draws on the
results of the survey interviews conducted on Langkai Island. A
geographically stratified random sampling was used for selecting
the respondents. Thirty-eight survey interviews were conducted
representing about 20% of the island’s fishing households. The
survey participants were the household heads (all male). The
households were selected in a lottery system from a list of
fishers. Only descriptive statistics was used since the low absolute
number of participants in the survey from Langkai Island does
not allow for in-depth statistical analysis.
RESULTS
Langkai Island: Fueling the Local Economy
At the end of the 1940s, only 10 people who were all fishers
permanently lived on Langkai Island. During that time, the
main fishing gear used by these fishers was hand-line and
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FIGURE 2 | Fishing gears used by Langkai fishers.
the most important targeted species was the Narrow-Barred
Spanish Mackerel (Scomberomorus commerson, called Tenggiri
in local language). Today, the island population has grown to 225
households of which 190 (∼84%) rely on fishing as their primary
and mostly only source of income. This reflects the fundamental
importance of marine resources to secure the local livelihoods.
The results of the survey show that numerous fishing gears
are used by Langkai islanders today (see Figure 2). Depending
on the season, most fishers used different gear types during
different times of the year. Yet, hand line still has remained
the most commonly used fishing gear to target a variety of
fishery resources (used by 41% of the fishers). The second most
commonly used fishing gear is gillnet, used by 32% of Langkai
Island’s fishers. Further gears used include driftnet, fish trap,
mobile lift net, and compressor diving, while some other gears
were only used to aminor extent. Despite the introduction of new
fishing gears over the past 50 years, which allowed the islanders
to target a wider range of fishery resources, the hand-line fishery
has remained particularly important for the local economy. The
continuous importance of the hand-line fishery is due to the
high abundance of economically valuable species in the area
that can be caught by hand-line, and especially the occurrence
of the Narrow-Barred Spanish Mackerel (which can be sold for
∼50–70,000 IDR2 per kilo) in the sea area surrounding Langkai
Island.
Yet, the lucrative target fish, such as Mackerel, are unevenly
distributed over the Spermonde Archipelago. Moreover, the
increasingly depleted fish stocks and degrading fish habitats in
the Spermonde Archipelago and the neighboring areas have
motivated fishermen to search for fish in other areas than only
the waters of their home islands. The sea territory surrounding
Langkai Island has remained a particularly rich fishing ground
where a wide range of valuablemarine resources are still available.
Hence, the area is not only subject to exploitation by local fishers
from Langkai Island, but attracts many fishers from other islands
and Sulawesi mainland fostering the competition for the valuable
resources in the area.
2At the time of this research, 1 Euro was equivalent to about 12,500 IDR
(Indonesian Rupiah).
Organizing Marine Resource Use:
Rules-in-Use in the Waters Surrounding
Langkai Island
Whilst not officiallymarked by flags or buoys, the “Langkai Island
Waters” is a commonly acknowledged and relatively clearly
defined marine territory surrounding the island. All interviewees
from Langkai Island and from elsewhere, who frequently use the
area for fishing, knew and acknowledged this. The interviewees
were able to relatively precisely draw the borders of this area
on a very large naval navigation map, and to describe the
borders mainly based on aspects of the underwater topography
and distinct features of the marine ecosystem. Since the area is
perceived to belong to the island, the local community considers
itself entitled to institute rules for the use of the area’s fishery
resources. Based on informal agreements, three locally devised
rules were instituted for the use of marine resources in the
Langkai Island Waters. These include the prohibition of (a) blast
fishing, (b) poison fishing, and (c) the use of spear-guns for
Mackerel fishing.
The surveillance and enforcement of these local rules were
carried out by the local resource users. In addition, an important
role in the sustained implementation of these rules and for
controlling what gear is used in the waters, so it was argued
in the interviews, attributes to the elected island leader (Ketua
Rukun Warga) to gain improved authority in rule enforcement.
Yet, neither the local community in Langkai Island in general nor
the island head in particular have a formal authority to develop
and enforce such locally devised fisheries management rules for
the Langkai Island Waters since the necessary official authority
(by law) does not extent out to the sea territory, but only accrues
to organizational matters on the community’s land. As for the
prohibition of blast and poison fishing, i.e., for the rules also
found in national law, the enforcement of these rules for the
Langkai Island Waters thus relies on the cooperation with the
Water Police based in Makassar City. This is a difficult situation,
so it was argued in the interviews, as the islanders do not hold
official authority to detain rule-breakers until the police arrives.
With regards to the spear-gun rule, there is no legal basis at all
and the Water Police is not entitled to engage in enforcing this
rule. Hence, the remaining option for the islanders to enforce
all three rules at the local level is to apply alternative informal
means for enforcement. Common practice is that, if somebody
is spotted in the Langkai waters who uses or is suspected to use
gears, which are prohibited by the local rules for the marine
territory, fishers form a group, ideally with the island leader
among them, and inform the respective fisher about the rules
that apply to the Langkai Island Waters. Usually, according to
the islanders, this is sufficient to scare the fishers away. If not,
Langkai islanders may also throw stones at the rule-breakers.
This common enforcement practice was also widely confirmed
by fishers from other islands, who fish in the Langkai Island
area, and whose inhabitants are particularly famous for fishing
with bombs, poison and spear-guns. In fact, it was stated in
the interviews in other islands that the interviewees heard that
the fishers of Langkai Island would even confiscate the fishing
gears, or set fishing boats on fire, which both would cause severe
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economic loss for the fishers. While it was widely confirmed in
the Langkai Island community and elsewhere that stones are used
to scare rule-breakers away, the more drastic measures may also
be a legend spread in the area.
The Role of the Local Community in Marine
Resource Management
This section illuminates the perceived impact of the rules
produced by the state CPRR and the CBM3 on the fishing practice
in the Langkai Island Waters based on the two Net-Map group
interview sessions. Figure 3A shows the results of the group
session with Barrang Lompo Island fishers, and Figure 3B shows
the results of the session with Langkai Island fishers.
Both groups identified fishers using different gear types in
the Langkai Island Waters (for details see Figure 3). The fishers
of Langkai Island created a more detailed picture of the fishing
gears used in the area, which is certainly due to their more
in-depth knowledge of the marine resources use patterns close
to their island. With regards to who has an influence on
marine resource use patterns in the area, both groups identified
the Water Police (which is based in Makassar City) and the
local community in Langkai Island. The notion of the Langkai
islanders in both group sessions represents their influence on
marine resource use patterns in the Langkai Island Waters.
Government departments, and particularly the Department of
Fishery and Marine Conservation (DKP), were only mentioned
to have an impact by the Barrang Lompo Island group. The
interview participants from Langkai Island did not see their
direct influence on the resource use patterns in the Langkai Island
Waters. This may be explained by the fact that Barrang Lompo
3Note that the Fish Aggregation Devices (see below) are located outside the
Langkai Island Waters and are thus not included in these interviews.
Island is relatively close to Makassar City, where the government
departments reside. Due to this proximity, and maybe also
due to the fact that the Barrang Lompo Island residents are
well-known throughout the Spermonde Archipelago for using
destructive fishing, government programs such as awareness
raising campaigns frequently target fishers from Barrang Lompo
Island, whilst such activities occur very rarely on Langkai Island.
Both groups argued in the interviews that the Water Police
has a strong influence on poison and blast fishers (influence is
marked by arrows in Figure 3), who attempt to fish in the area.
The Langkai Island community was also found to affect these two
types of fishing operations as a result of the informal agreements
for this specific portion of marine territory. Moreover, the
Langkai Islanders also influence the use of spear-gun fishers as,
based on the local rules, they are not allowed to fish for Mackerel
in that area. Hence, in the view of the both Net-Map groups,
both government actors and the island community contribute to
regulate marine resource use in the Langkai Island Waters.
Participants of both sessions agreed that the Water Police has
the maximum possible influence (indicated by the size of the
dots in Figure 3) on the resources use patterns in the Langkai
Island Waters due to their official power of apprehending fishers
using illegal gears. Despite the fact that illegal fishers will most
probably not be prosecuted in court, participants in both groups
argued that, if caught by the Water Police, illegal fishers will
still spend some days or even weeks in jail during which they
cannot generate income for their family, and that they also have
to spend a significant amount of money for their release. This
means a substantial financial loss for these fishers. However, it
was argued in both sessions that, while theWater Police generally
exerts strong influence on the resource use patterns, patrolling
only occurs rarely in the general Langkai Island area, as it is far
from the police station in Makassar City, and patrolling the area
FIGURE 3 | Managing marine resources in the Langkai Island Waters. The figure shows the perceived impact of the state CPRR and the CBM on marine
resource use in the Langkai Island Waters based on the Net-Map group interviews with fishers from Barrang Lompo Island (A), and with fishers from Langkai Island
(B). The arrows indicate that an actor exercises influence toward another actor in the Langkai Island Waters. The size of the dots is scaled to the perceived influence
of the actor on resource use in the area on a scale between 1 and 4 (the larger the dots, the higher is the perceived influence).
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requires high financial input in terms of gasoline. In addition, the
large Water Police boats are visible from a long distance and, if
they are in the area, fishers will not carry out any illegal fishing
operations. Therefore, while the general influence of the Water
Police in terms of deterring blast and poison fishing when in the
area is considered high, their actual impact on avoiding illegal
fishing operation in the Langkai Island Waters is limited due to
their rare presence in the area. By the participants of the Barrang
Lompo Island group, the other government actors were perceived
to be less influential compared to the Water Police. It was argued
that the influence of the other government actors stems from the
awareness raising campaigns about the danger of blast and poison
fishing, which led some of the respective fishers to reconsider
their fishing practice.
The perception on the influence of the local community
on Langkai Island on the resources use patterns in the area
slightly varies between the Net-Map sessions conducted in the
two islands. The Barrang Lompo Island interview group saw
less influence of the Langkai Island community compared to the
Water Police. In contrast, the Langkai Island interview group
also perceived the island community to have maximal influence.
Participants in the Langkai Island group argued that they can
develop rules for the area, which are complied with by the
fishers from Langkai Island itself, and also by the majority of
outsiders. Yet, the participants also highlighted that their means
of actual enforcement is limited as they do not possess legal
enforcement authority. The Langkai Island group reported that
the cooperation with the police “is not always easy” as the
police may be in other parts of the Spermonde Archipelago,
or elsewhere, and may not come to Langkai Island, even upon
request by the islanders. Therefore, Langkai Islanders usually
rather tend to only scare rule-breakers away from the area instead
of detaining them and cooperate with the police. The participants
in the Barrang Lompo Island group argued along similar lines but
especially highlighted that the islanders do not possess official
authority to enforce rules in the Langkai Island Waters and,
therefore, awarded the local community in Langkai Island with
less than the maximum amount of “influence points.”
Community-Based Management of Marine
Resources: Why Do Local Fishers Engage
in Rule Enforcement?
The support of local initiatives and the active engagement of
a high share of the community in the enforcement of the
related rules is a necessary precondition for a functioning
rule system. This section illuminates the rationales behind the
motivation of local fishers on Langkai Island to engage in the
enforcement of the locally devised rules. Table 2 at the end of
this section summarizes the fishers’ rationales for engaging in the
enforcement of the local rules.
Blast Fishing
Blast fishing is widely used in the Spermonde Archipelago. While
there was also a more frequent use by fishers from Langkai Island
up to the 1990s, today, only one fisher sometimes uses small
bombs. The fishing practice by this fisher is despised by the
other community members, but it was argued in the interviews
that the other fishers cannot do much about it, except for trying
to keep the fisher from operating the bombs in the Langkai
Island Waters. Whilst a number of people on Langkai Island
reported that they are also very strict on enforcing the blast
fishing prohibition, in fact, other fishers reported that they tend
to remain “inactive” in the enforcement of this rule and rather
tolerate the use of blast fishing in the Langkai Island Waters for
four main types of reasons.
(1) Issues in enforcement: In addition to the previously described
issues related to the coordination with the police, another
problem with the enforcement of this rule was highlighted
in the interviews. If fishers use illegal fishing gears or act
suspiciously, and Langkai islanders want to search their boats
for illegal fishing gears, a common problem relates to the
fact that the fishers who use explosives for fishing frequently
have boats with stronger engines than the Langkai Island
fishers with their rather simple and small boats. The blast
fishers thus usually can escape before the Langkai islanders
get the chance to come aboard. While the overall goal to
prevent fishers from using blast fishing in the Langkai Island
Waters is hereby achieved, this adds to the problem of
cooperation with the Water Police since the islanders can
rarely detain blast fishers. According to the interviewees,
the overall problematic enforcement situation decreases the
motivation of trying to catch blast fishers since it is often
perceived as “not to be worth the effort.”
(2) Reciprocity: Reciprocal hospitality represents an important
aspect in the wider Spermonde Archipelago. In case fishers
come from distant areas during their fishing trips to the
prosperous fishing grounds of Langkai Island, or go fishing
in the open water beyond the shelf of the Spermonde
Archipelago platform, fishers stay overnight in the Langkai
Island area. The local term Sawakung refers to layovers in
foreign islands or on their boats adjacent to the island during
fishing trips. They are of mutual benefit for the guest and the
host. While outside fishers are provided with shelter, goods
and services in the host island, these layovers hereby generate
additional revenues for the Langkai Island community.
Moreover, these stays facilitate knowledge exchange between
the islanders and outsiders. Despite the rich fishing grounds
in the Langkai Island area, some of the fishers from Langkai
Island sometimes themselves perform long-distance fishing
trips to other fishing grounds, and have to do layovers in the
nearby islands. The interviewees in Langkai Island expressed
concerns that, if they engage in trying to detain or scaring
rule-breaking fishers such as blast fishers away, they would
deny the outside fishers access to the fishing area. This
would create problems for the Langkai fishers in case they
themselves needed to visit the home island of these outside
fishers for a layover. Langkai fishers thus feared that their
engagement in rule enforcement would seriously affect their
fishing operation in a negative way if they were not able
anymore to visit the fishing grounds close the respective
islands where the Langkai fishers themselves relied on the
goods and services offered by the host community. Another
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more general worry with regards to reciprocity was that the
fishers using illegal fishing gears are believed to have very
good relations with “important people” in Makassar City,
which is why blast and poison fishers most probably will
not be prosecuted for illegal fishing. Moreover, interviewees
feared that they themselves would “get problems” if handing
over illegal fishers to the police since it might be taken as an
offense by “the important people in Makassar” to apprehend
fishers who are under their protectorate.
(3) Lack of perceived strong negative impact on own fishery yield:
Almost all hand-line fishers, who target Mackerel, perceived
that blast fishing operations would not have severe negative
consequences for their own fishing. TheMackerel is no target
fish for blast fishing. Interviewees highlighted that Mackerel
only occurs in small groups of few individuals while blast
fishers only target schools of fish to increase the profitability
of the blast fishing operation. Moreover, it was stated that the
Mackerel moves too fast to be caught by a bomb operation.
The blast fishers thus can only catch Mackerel accidentally,
which was referred to as “a lucky accident for them,” but not
on purpose. It further seems to be commonly perceived that
the Mackerel spawns on the seafloor, whilst the bomb is not
operated close to the seafloor due to the danger of particles
that may be expelled from the water by the explosion. Blast
fishing is thus believed to also not affect the Mackerels’
spawning grounds. For that reason, the fishers argued that
blast fishing has limited effects on the abundance of their
target fish, and its spawning grounds. As a result, the blast
fishing is seen not to have severe negative consequences on
their yields. Similarly, the gillnet fishers also saw no direct
negative impact of blast fishing on their yields, for the same
reasons4.
(4) Benefit-sharing: A strong argument produced in the
interviews was that there is a general understanding in the
Spermonde Archipelago that, if the blast fishers operate a
bomb, everyone who is nearby can assist the blast fishers
in collecting the “harvested fish,” of which a helper would
get a share of one out of three parts of the fish collected by
him (see also description by Chozin, 2008; Deswandi, 2012).
This provides a strong economic incentive for some islanders
to assist the blast fishers instead of enforcing the local rule.
In addition, the benefit-sharing was perceived to be a type
of compensation mechanism for the environmental damage
caused to the marine ecosystems in Langkai Island Waters.
Poison Fishing
The situation with poison fishing is different and at the time of
this study there were no active poison fishers on Langkai Island.
According to the informants, the prohibition of poison fishing
was enforced much stricter locally than the prohibition of blast
fishing. While the (1) issues in enforcement, and (2) reciprocity, as
described in the previous section, remain the same in the given
rationales for engaging in the enforcement of the poison fishing
rule, in contrast, the (3) perceived strong negative impact on own
4It could not be revealed in further communication on the matter with marine
biologists whether this perception holds true, or whether this is a misperception.
fishery yield, and the (4) benefit-sharing differed for the case of
poison fishing.
(3) Perceived strong negative impact on own fishery yield: It
was argued in all interviews that poison fishing is believed
to cause much stronger negative environmental impacts
than blast fishing. Poison fishers specifically target coral
reef fish. Anecdotal evidence suggests, so it was argued in
the interviews, that the poison, if distributed by the local
currents, may “turn a vast marine area in a dead zone.” This
includes the destruction of large coral reef areas, and of the
majority of marine life that happens to be in the area during
the time of fishing operation. Based on the perception of the
interviewees, poison fishing causes a much stronger impact
on the environment and on their own fishing yield5.
(4) Lack of benefit-sharing: Unlike the blast fishers, who
provide an economic incentive in exchange for the
environmental damage caused, poison fishers do not share
their catch with other fishers. Hence, poison fishing
offers no economic incentives for the local community to
tolerate it.
Spear-Gun Fishing for Mackerels
The third local rule-in-use relates to the prohibition of spear-gun
fishing for Mackerel, one of the marine resource most valuable to
the Langkai Island fishing community. This rule appeared to be
at least as strictly enforced locally as the prohibition of poison
fishing. The reasons behind (1) issues in enforcement, and (2)
reciprocity, as already outlined before, also remain to some extent
for this rule, but cooperation with state actors was not possible at
all. Differences compared to the blast fishing rule again accrue to
the (3) perceived strong negative impact on own fishery yield, and
the (4) benefit-sharing.
(3) Perceived strong negative impact on own fishery yield:
The Mackerel fishery is vital for the local economy on
Langkai Island. Hand-line and spear-gun are the two fishing
gears most adequate to target Mackerel. According to the
informants, the agreement to prohibit the use of spear-
guns for Mackerel fishing has two central reasons. First, as
previously noted, the price for Mackerel caught by hand-
line ranged between 50 and 70,000 IDR6 per kilo at the
time of this research. The kilo price for Mackerel caught by
spear-gun was with 40–45,000 IDR much lower. The lower
price results from the fact that the fish caught by spear-
gun displays strong visible marks (i.e., the entry and exit
injuries of the spear). To achieve the highest possible price
for the amount of fish in the area, spear-guns are not used by
the Langkai Island community, but only by outsiders. The
spear-gun, however, is more effective than using hand-lines,
and more fish can be caught in less time. If fishers from
other areas use spear-guns, they have an advantage over the
Langkai Island fishers and can catch a larger share of the total
5It could not be revealed in further communication on the matter with marine
biologists whether this strong impact is true, or whether this is a misperception.
6At the time of this research, 1 Euro was equivalent to about 12,500 IDR
(Indonesian currency).
Frontiers in Marine Science | www.frontiersin.org 9 July 2016 | Volume 3 | Article 120
Gorris CBM in an Indonesian Small Island Context
fish in the area, but the overall yield will only be sold at a
lower overall price. This would decrease the overall revenue
that could be generated from the fish in the area. The second
reason for the agreement is that the local Mackerel fishers
perceived that, if Mackerel is caught by a spear-gun, the
remaining fish will be scared away due to the fast movement
of the spear and the blood spilled into the water. It was
argued that, if only hand-lines are used to catch Mackerel,
the “fellow fish” will not notice that “somebody” is missing
and stay in the area while the use of spear-guns “scares them”
away immediately.While fishers would prefer an overall legal
prohibition of the use of spear-guns for Mackerel fishing
in the entire archipelago, it was argued that the Langkai
Island community can only influence what happens in the
Langkai IslandWaters. Both objectives of the rule thus relate
to achieving the highest economic return from the overall
abundance of the fish in the area.
(4) Lack of benefit-sharing: The use of spear-guns for fishing
Mackerel by outside fishers offers no economic incentives for
the local community to tolerate it.
Fish Aggregation Devices (FAD)
In addition to the rules pertaining to the Langkai Island Waters,
a further local informal agreement is found in the area. A Fish
Aggregation Device (FAD, locally called rumpon) is a tool to
attract fish and keep them nearby. It is an effective tool to
concentrate fish in a certain area, which then can be easily
harvested. Langkai Island fishers installed FAD westwards off
the island, already outside of the area that is perceived to be
the Langkai Island Waters. The general understanding among
the fishers, not only in Langkai Island but also in other areas
of the Spermonde Archipelago (cf. Chozin, 2008), is that who
owns the FAD, and maintains it, also privately owns the fish that
it aggregates, and that fishing around the FAD is prohibited, or
requires the permission of the owner. The informal agreements
regarding the FADs thus can be considered a private CPRR in
which individuals own a set of marine resources in a defined
marine area. For harvesting the fish around the FAD, some
owners on Langkai Island collaborate with purse-seine fishers
from other areas. The general agreement for the FAD is that if
there is enough fish in the area, the purse-seine fishers will inform
the owner that they now start to harvest. When harvesting a FAD,
the catch will be shared and the total amount of harvested fish
divided into four parts, of which one part goes to the FAD owner,
whilst the other three parts go to the boat that harvests the fish7.
If the FAD owner himself harvests the FAD, of course, he keeps
the fish to himself. Since the rules associated with the FAD are no
CBM rules, but the rules relate to a private CPRR, different issues
arise compared to the CBM rules. The clearly economical nature
underlying the motivation of the owner to engage in enforcement
is obvious, and all owners reported that they try to enforce the
rules as strictly as possible.
(1) Issues in enforcement: A central issue for enforcement relates
to the fact that the rules for the FAD are based on a private
CPRR instead of a CBM. This means that the owner is the
main person responsible for monitoring the rule, not the
whole community. While the motivation of the owner to
engage in enforcement is obviously high, monitoring a FAD
(or several FAD) that is not in direct vicinity of the island
is highly difficult for a single person (in some instances they
are assisted by other family members). In addition, similar
to the spear-gun rule, the lack of legal recognition of this
private CPRR complicates the enforcement. In case the rules
are broken by “illegal” fishing around the FAD, the owner
will claim a large compensation fee from the rule-breaker,
which already happened in the past, as reported in several
interviews. In both interviews with islanders and district
government officials, it was stated that the arrangement is
also agreed upon with district government officials, who
may voluntarily support the owners of FAD in settling their
claim, but without legal recognition of the arrangement.
Particularly the lack of legal recognition of the individual
ownership of the FAD owners thus presents a drawback for
the effective settlement of potential compensation claims by
the FAD owner for rule-breaking.
(2) Reciprocity: Whilst the incentive is high to “steal” fish
from FAD owners, especially reciprocity-related social and
economic sanctions prevent this from happening. The
vast majority of the Langkai Island community members
stated that they would not steal from the FAD as the fish
belongs to the owner, and, if they were caught, they would
7Note that there seem to be different agreements related to the FAD in the wider
Spermonde Archipelago area. Chozin (2008) describes the FAD as a tool that is
harvested by blast fishers using bombs. According to his detailed ethnographic
description of another area in the Spermonde Archipelago, the sharing ratio is 2:3
in which the owner of the FAD gets two portions of the fish and the harvester gets
three. As for the Langkai Island FAD, the FAD are harvested by Purse-Seine fishers,
which also might explain the different share-ratio between the harvester and the
FAD owner.
TABLE 2 | Summary of the Fishers’ rationales for engaging in the enforcement of the local rules.
Locally devised rules
pertaining to gear
type
Gear used
by islanders
Issues in
enforcement
Reciprocity issues negatively
affecting engagement in
enforcement
Perceived
impact on own
yield
Benefit-sharing Involvement in
rule enforcement
Blast fishing (Almost) No Yes Yes Low Yes Low
Poison fishing No Yes Yes High No High
Spear gun fishing No Yes Yes High No High
Fish Aggregation
Device (FAD)
Yes Yes No High No High
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“feel ashamed” and had to pay a high compensation fee.
Outside fishers also reported that they feared hostility during
Sawakung if they broke the rule, which would complicate
their visits to the fishing grounds close Langkai Island. This
shows that for the rules related to the FAD, the issues
surrounding reciprocity support the compliance with the
FAD rules due to the fear of social and economic sanction.
(3) Perceived strong negative impact on own fishery yield: As a
matter of course, breaking the rules related to the FAD by
non-owners was perceived to seriously harm the owners’
income.
(4) Benefit-sharing: When “stealing” from the FAD, there is
no benefit-sharing of the rule breaker that could relax the
engagement of the FAD owner in enforcement.
DISCUSSION
Effective means to address the unregulated and uncontrolled use
of marine ecosystems and their associated natural resources are
urgently needed (The World Bank, 2006; Young et al., 2007).
While local approaches appear to be a promising means to
achieve more successful natural resource management (Ruddle,
1999; Armitage, 2005; Ferse et al., 2010, 2014; Cinner et al., 2012),
CBM harbors a series of hazards (Berkes, 2004; Cudney-Bueno
and Basurto, 2009; Cinner et al., 2012). A better understanding
of these hazards is needed to contribute to institute more
successful CBM.
In line with other observations from Indonesia and elsewhere,
this study supports previous research that challenges the
portrayal of CBM as isolated endeavors in which communities
are buffered from the “outside” world (Agrawal and Gibson,
1999; Berkes, 2004, 2007b; Cudney-Bueno and Basurto, 2009;
Seixas and Berkes, 2010; Adhuri, 2013; Pauwelussen, 2016). The
results of this study show that particular problems emerge from
“trans-local” variables, which hamper the effectiveness of the
self-organized local endeavors. Moreover, the study illuminates
that divergences in the economic rationales of the community
members are an important factor which affect their motivations
to engage (or not) in local approaches to managing marine
resources.
The Challenge of (Self-) Organizing Local
Approaches to Managing Marine
Resources in Context of an Entangled
CPRR System
The marine resource use patterns in the sea area around Langkai
Island are impacted by a convoluted rule system generated
by different types of CPRR. While the Indonesian state CPRR
rules to ban highly destructive fishing are indeed found to
have a perceived impact on the marine resource use in the
waters surrounding Langkai Island, this study confirms wider
observations that the enforcement of environmental law is
fraught with difficulties (cf. Idrus, 2009; Glaser et al., 2010;Wever
et al., 2012). Especially corruption, the long distance from the
Water Police base to the case study area, and insufficient funds for
adequate patrolling are central factors resulting in enforcement
shortcomings of the rules produced by the state CPRR. This
represents an eminent threat to the marine ecosystems and the
abundance of fishery resources (Patlis et al., 2001; Dirhamsyah,
2006; Jones et al., 2011). Partly in response to the shortcomings of
the state CPRR, local rules-in-use have emerged in the case study
area despite the lack of legal authority to do so. Area-specific
stewardship for a marine territory surrounding Langkai Island
(CBM) and individual ownership (private CPRR) was informally
institutionalized and locally devised rules based on informal
agreements were instituted for a specified portion of the sea
area surrounding Langkai Island. However, while the islanders’
authority to devise rules for the Langkai Island Waters may be to
some extent informally acknowledged by outside fishers, the self-
organized local initiative lacks the official authority to formally
develop and especially to locally enforce rules. As a result, close
coordination between the local community and state actors is
needed which represents a strong challenge, especially in context
of a remote small island community.
In consequence, the findings of this research further support
the classical argument made for instance by Ostrom (1990,
2005) that, in order to contribute to increase effectiveness of
self-organized local endeavors, and to reduce the challenge
of coordination with higher level state actors for instituting
and enforcing rules, a clear allocation of rights to the local
level to devise rules, and the endowment of the community
with appropriate legal means to enforce the rules, is essential.
Moreover, Seixas and Berkes (2010), who explored success factors
in multiple case studies on community-based enterprises in
natural resource management, found in this regard that networks
and partnerships which extend beyond the boundaries of a
community are an important means to improve coordination
in a nested rule system. Given the findings of this research
together with the results of other studies from Indonesia and
elsewhere (cf. Adhuri and Visser, 2006; Cudney-Bueno and
Basurto, 2009; Gasalla, 2011), both aspects appear to be highly
salient to effect more successful self-organized local natural
resource management.
CBM in a Regional Resource Use System
The active engagement of the local population in the
implementation of local regulations is a necessary precondition
for a successful CBM initiative. In this respect, the analysis of
local resource users’ perceptions, which are socially constructed
and informed by both personal experience and the information
available (Clayton and Myers, 2009), are crucial to understand
what motivates (or not) individuals to engage in CBM of marine
resources (McClanahan et al., 2005; Walker-Springett et al.,
2016). This study reveals how the divergences in the perceptions
of the members in a community affect their motivation to
engage in the CBM endeavor. Moreover, the findings particularly
illustrate the challenges of dealing with factors that lie outside
the influence sphere of a community.
The vast majority of Langkai Island fishers cooperate and
comply with “their” rules as produced by the CBM and the
private CPRR. The fishers of the Langkai Island community
neither use poison fishing, nor blast fishing, nor spear-guns in
the Langkai Island Waters. Moreover, poaching at the FAD is
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perceived to be highly risky as it is difficult to conceal it in
such a small island community. Thus, in fact, the rationales
underlying the motivation of the islander to engage in rule
enforcement, as reported in this study, mainly relate to rule-
breaking of outsiders and, therefore, have to be understood in
the context of defending the local resources against undesirable
fishing behavior by non-community members. While research
has shown that social sanctions can effectively induce intra-
community cooperation for collective action and compliance
among community members (Ostrom, 1990, 1999, 2005),
this study shows that this does not necessarily apply for
non-community members. Rather, inter-community reciprocity
concerns may arise when engaging in enforcing the local rules
against outsiders, which can hamper the effective enforcement
of the local rules. As a result, the reliance on social sanctions
may be a pitfall in effecting rule compliance when the aim is to
defend local resources against outsiders (see also, for instance,
Cudney-Bueno and Basurto, 2009).
The findings show that there are differences in the strictness
of the enforcement of the local rules. These differences mainly
stem from economic rationales of the community members. In
fact, the motivation for the engagement in the enforcement of the
local rules by the Langkai islanders are strongly based on short-
term economic considerations, i.e., on a “give-and-take” basis
in the local context. If the fishing activities of rule-breakers are
not perceived to strongly harm the fishing yield of individuals,
and/or if benefits of the generated yields are shared with the
Langkai Island community as a compensation mechanism for
the environmental harm caused, the motivation of the affected
community members to engage in rule enforcement seems to
cease. As a result, the prohibition of the fishing activities,
which are perceived to cause a stronger impact on the short-
term economic return of local fishers without compensation
mechanisms are much stronger enforced. Ostrom (1990) raised
concerns that the compliance of community members with
self-organized rules that regulate the use of natural resources
may be undermined, if resource users value the expected future
opportunity of resource availability and possible future gains less
than the value they can generate now or in the near future.
While this may hold true for intra-community compliance to
self-organized rules, the findings of this study indicate that the
perceived danger of short-term economic losses of the local
community members may be a particular success factor of a CBM
initiative, if the aim of a CBM initiative involves to defend local
resources against undesired use forms by outsiders.
Despite the presence of diverse rules-in-use for organizing the
marine resource use in the case study area, conservation thinking,
i.e., the aim to preserve an intact local marine environment in
the long run, played almost no role in the rationales given in
all interviews. Rather, it appears that the locally devised rules
in that area intend to ensure that the local community gets an
adequate share of the diminishing local marine resources, which
are exploited by a growing number of fishers from elsewhere. This
also leads to concerns that the environmental conservation effects
of the locally devised rules in the area may be limited and should
be considered incidental.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Especially in tropical nations with weak state institutions such as
Indonesia, CBM has been widely advocated for its potential to
achieve more effective natural resource management. However,
detailed case study analyses of the challenges for implementing
CBM in a particular sea territory remain very rare, but are
particularly needed to understand the potential pitfalls for
local approaches to marine resource management. This article
provided a detailed analysis of a case study in Indonesia to
contribute to fill this gap and help to institute more effective
community-based marine resource management.
The results of this study particularly emphasize the context
dependence of the success of a CBM initiative for marine
resources because a certain CBM initiative, even in what seems to
be a small community in a remote island setting, is characterized
by internal divergences, and by “trans-local” variables which
create complex interdependencies. Especially divergences in the
economic rationales of the community members are important
factors which affect their motivation to engage (or not) in
both the CBM and the private CPRR. While especially short-
term economic considerations appear to be a particular success
factor in this study, such rationales underlying the motivation of
community members to engage in CBM raise concerns about the
sustainability orientation of the local measures.
While the scope of this research with its narrow focus on a
small sea territory appears limited, the study brings a suite of
aspects to attention that are often overlooked, but are highly
salient to understand the factors underlying successful CBM.
Moreover, the situation in this island mirrors the situation
of communities in other areas in Indonesia, and also in
other countries with weak state institutions. Further research
is especially needed on how to address the pitfalls of CBM
that are induced by factors that lie beyond the reach of local
communities, and on mechanisms for improved coordination
between the different types of CPRR. This is particularly urgent
for remote places such as a small island, where large portions of
the population heavily depend on increasingly degraded resource
systems to secure their livelihoods. Moreover, perception studies
represent important means to assist marine planners, policy
makers and natural resource managers to better understand the
reality of CBM initiatives.
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